I. INTRODUCTION
You have had a really bad day. Your neighbor killed your dog, a mixed-breed dog you rescued from the pound, which your two-year-old daughter adored. Someone copied one of your songs to her iPhone without paying the required ninety-nine cents. 1 At the end of your dinner out, your restaurant printed a receipt showing the last six digits of your credit card number in violation of a rule that required redaction of all but the last five. You were then denied entrance to a night club because of your race.
Perhaps you should sue. (This is, after all, a law review article.) But what are your damages? Economically, the death of your dog may have been a gain, not a loss at all; your much-loved dog had a negligible fair market value and promised to cost you large amounts for food and health care over its lifetime. Your loss from the illegal download is easily measured-you are out the ninety-nine cents (or, more accurately, your share of it)-but a lawsuit to recover that amount would be impractical. It is unlikely that printing six digits of your credit card number will cause you any harm whatever, notwithstanding the clear violation of the relevant regulatory regime. And even if your exclusion from the nightclub denied your equal dignity as a human being and offended core American values, it may have caused you no economic or other concrete damage and annoyed you only slightly. What is a legal system to do?
Either federal law or the law of one or more states addresses these problems by awarding statutory damages-damages to which you may be entitled without having to prove the amount, or more commonly even the existence, of actual damages under ordinary common law principles. In Tennessee, a pet owner may obtain non-economic damages up to $5000 for the death of his or her pet against the person who is liable for causing Vol. 66 the death or injuries that led to the animal's death. 2 The person causing the pet's death must have done so intentionally or, if negligently, the incident must have occurred either on the owner or pet caretaker's property or while in the control and supervision of the caretaker. 3 Under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages, of between $750 and $30,000 per infringed work, as the finder of fact deems "just." 4 No actual damages need be shown. If the finder of fact finds that the infringement was "willful," it can award up to $150,000 per infringed work. 5 Section 1681n(a) of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA") awards statutory damages of between $100 and $1000 for willful failure to comply with the act's disclosure requirements, 6 including its requirement that retailers redact all but the last five digits of the customer's credit card from any printed receipt. 7 Finally, in California, anyone discriminated against on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or disability in access to public accommodations can recover $4000 in statutory damages. 8 On its face, authorization of statutory damages might seem to constitute a simple, reasonable, and straightforward solution to what might otherwise be difficult and expensive litigation problems. But consider some recent difficulties.
In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 9 plaintiff record company sought an award of approximately $1.5 billion in statutory damages for infringement of its songs by defendant. 10 Observing that plaintiffs also sought damages from individual users, which could amount to trillions of dollars, the court noted, "Plaintiffs are suggesting an award that is 'more money than the entire music recording industry has made since Edison's invention of the phonograph in 1877. '" 11 Similarly, in Blanco v. CEC Entertainment Concepts L.P., 12 plaintiff alleged that Chuck E. Cheese, a chain restaurant catering to children, had printed prohibited credit card information in violation of FACTAspecifically by printing more than the last five digits of the card number or expiration dates on its receipts. 13 Because the case was brought as a class action, statutory damages were expected to range from a minimum of $198,025,000 to a maximum of $1,980,250,000, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff admitted she had incurred no actual harm and could not allege any harm to the class. 14 The court noted that the "end result would be grossly disproportionate to the harm, especially when Defendant immediately rectified this technical problem after the lawsuit was filed." 15 Although the court denied class certification, the case achieved notoriety because of the size of the requested award. 16 The case raised an obvious question: Is a two-billion dollar penalty really necessary to induce restaurants to print the right number of digits on their receipts? We will refer to the compounding of statutory damages in class actions as the "Chuck E. Cheese problem" below.
Or compare the following two cases. In Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, defendant, a single mother, illegally downloaded and shared twenty-four songs over the Internet. 17 A jury originally awarded statutory damages of $9250 per song, 18 for a total of $220,000, a verdict which the trial judge vacated as "wholly disproportionate" to the damages suffered by plaintiff record company. 19 On remand, the jury increased the award to $80,000 per song, for a total award of $1.92 million. 20 The facts in BMG 
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Lower courts have also declined to apply Doe's logic to the Video Privacy Protection Act, 33 seen, statutory damages are typically authorized in contexts in which actual damages are hard to prove or are believed to be inadequate either to encourage private enforcement or deter prohibited behavior. Part IV turns to some of the problems statutory damage rules have triggered, together with possible solutions. Part V, finally, concludes.
II. A SAMPLING OF STATUTORY DAMAGE PROVISIONS
To better understand both the problems statutory damages are designed to address and the problems they sometimes create, it may be useful to begin by reviewing a sample of existing statutory damage rules, both state and federal. It is not possible exhaustively to catalogue all such rules, since statutory damage provisions are not identified as such in codes or compilations and no simple database search exists to identify them. The rules explored in this Part II should therefore be viewed as illustrative. Nevertheless, for the most part, statutory damage rules appear to fall into four general categories: (1) rules for the protection of intellectual property, (2) business regulatory rules, now more commonly known as consumer or labor protection rules, (3) rules governing the protection or dissemination of information, and (4) civil rights rules. A few provisions outside these four categories will be sampled as well.
A. Rules for the Protection of Intellectual Property
Statutory damages for violations of copyright have been part of AngloAmerican law for at least three centuries. The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, provided for damages of "one penny for every sheet which shall be found in [ Opponents of the change asserted that discretionary damages of this kind were unprecedented. 48 As will be seen, this assertion 40. Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount -1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the "labor earnings" measure under "income or wealth," enter "1790" in the "Initial Year" field, "0.50" in the "Initial Amount" field, and "2015" in the "Desired Year" field). The difference between equivalents computed by reference to earnings of unskilled workers and equivalents computed by reference to earnings of manufacturing workers is presumably due to the increase, over time, of the latter relative to the former.
41. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 171, 171-72. 42. Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount -1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the "labor earnings" measure under "income or wealth," enter "1802" in the "Initial Year" field, "1.00" in the "Initial Amount" field, and "2015" in the "Desired Year" field).
43. Copyright Act Amendment 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 44. Id. at 139. 45. Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount -1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the "labor earnings" measure under "income or wealth," enter "1856" in the "Initial Year" field, "100" in the "Initial Amount" field, and "2015" in the "Desired Year" field).
46 Plaintiffs could now receive damages greater than the statutory minimum without proving anything other than bare infringement, and without any guidance to the decision-maker other than to award such damages as shall "appear to be just." 51 Finally, in 1998, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., the Supreme Court held that as a matter of constitutional law, in a copyright or any other case tried before a jury "'in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are] recognized,'" the amount of any statutory damage award had to be set by the jury.
52
Under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act today, plaintiff, at its election, may recover statutory damages ranging from a minimum of $750 per work infringed up to $30,000 per work infringed, all as the jury considers "just," without any showing of actual damage.
53
If the jury finds that the infringement was "willful," it can award up to $150,000 per work.
54
In awarding plaintiff only $1.92 million as damages for defendant's unauthorized downloading of twenty-four songs, therefore, the jury in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset was being kind to defendant. It could have awarded up to $3.6 million.
Congress has used the same model to protect trademarks. uscompare/ (to obtain the "labor earnings" measure under "income or wealth," enter "1887" in the "Initial Year" field, "50" in the "Initial Amount" field, and "2015" in the "Desired Year" field; subsequently, using the same dates, enter "300" in the "Initial Amount" field).
64. and adding further,
[n]or does giving the penalty to the aggrieved passenger require that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state.
67
Modern consumer protection statutes that use statutory damages as part of their enforcement mechanisms include the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). 68 For violations of the FDCPA's regulation of debt collectors, plaintiffs are entitled to as much as $1,000 for a violation.
69
To avoid the Chuck E. Cheese problem, FDCPA provides that in class actions plaintiffs may only recover the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of defendant's net worth. 70 Statutory damages may be recovered whether or not actual damages exist. 71 Punitive damages, however, are not recoverable. 72 The amount of statutory damages is discretionary with the court, based upon factors listed in the statute: (1) the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, (2) the nature of the noncompliance, and (3) the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional. 73 This last factor, the extent to which noncompliance was intentional, makes it clear that statutory damages can be awarded even for unintentional violations. Courts have limited the effectiveness of the statute in the individual action context, however, by construing it to authorize a maximum of $1000 damages per action, regardless of the number of violations proved, 74 making it less likely that plaintiffs will bring individual lawsuits under the act. In the case of class action lawsuits, the statute directs the court to consider the same three factors, in addition to the resources of the debt collector and the number of persons adversely affected by the debt collector's conduct. 75 In either type of case, the court has the discretion to award no statutory damages, again regardless of the number of violations proved.
76
A similar enforcement regime is established by the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 ("EFTA"), 77 which defines the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems. One of its stated objectives is the protection of consumer rights.
78
Pursuant to this goal, the statute authorizes statutory damages in individual actions in "an amount not less than $100 nor greater than $1,000." 79 In the case of a class action, however, awards are to be made in the court's discretion:
except that (i) as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and (ii) the total recovery . . . in any class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply by the same person shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the defendant.
80
Like the FDCPA, therefore, the EFTA avoids the Chuck E. Cheese problem.
In both individual and class actions, the EFTA provides an unusual degree of guidance to the court making the award, instructing it to consider:
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A) [of this section], the frequency and persistence of noncompliance, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional; or (2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B) [of this section], the frequency and persistence of noncompliance, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the defendant, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional. the sum of (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure; (2) [statutory damages ranging from twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction to $5,000, depending on circumstances]; (3) . . . the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court; and (4) in [a limited subset of cases], an amount equal to the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor demonstrates that the failure to comply is not material.
83
Like the FDCPA and the EFTA, the TILA alters these rules for class actions, providing except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the total recovery under this subparagraph in any class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply by the same creditor shall not be more than the lesser of $1,000,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor.
84
Congress has also used statutory damages to enforce the odometer provisions of the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act.
85
The Act prohibits tampering with odometers on motor vehicles and establishes safeguards for the protection of persons who purchase vehicles with altered or reset odometers. 86 It provides further that a person who violates its provisions with the intention to defraud is liable for three times actual damages or $10,000, whichever is greater.
87
The corresponding Ohio statute, the Ohio Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act, 88 similarly prohibits tampering with motor vehicle odometers and adds state law safeguards to protect purchasers of motor vehicles with altered or reset odometers.
89
Damages available under the Ohio law equal "three times the amount of actual damages sustained or fifteen hundred dollars, whichever is greater." In the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the Act's requirements with respect to servicing of mortgage loans and administration of escrow accounts, violators are liable for actual damages plus any additional damages, as the court may allow, in an amount not to exceed $2,000.
94
In this context, statutory damages are only authorized in the case of a pattern or practice of violations; 95 in effect, this act, unlike most others, requires persistent bad behavior before statutory damages can be awarded.
Statutory damages provisions also commonly appear in state rules governing the return of security deposits to tenants. In California, for example, if a landlord fails in bad faith to return a deposit, the tenant may recover up to $200 in addition to actual damages.
96
In Georgia, any landlord who wrongfully retains a security deposit in violation of statutorily required procedures designed to prevent landlords from doing so is liable for up to three times the amount improperly withheld plus attorney's fees. 97 Hawaii's Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act provides that any health-care provider or institution that intentionally violates the Act's health-care decision-making rules will be liable for "damages of $500 or actual damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees." The federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act of 1983 ("MSAWPA") 100 was enacted to improve the working conditions of migrant workers. 101 Congress evidently believed that providing for statutory damages would help to promote enforcement, deter violations, and more likely compensate farm workers for their injuries.
102
The Act therefore provides for statutory damages of up to $500 per plaintiff per violation.
103
Multiple infractions of the same provision, however, only constitute a single violation.
104
If a class action is certified then the maximum permitted award is the lesser of $500 per plaintiff per violation and $500,000 total.
105
The court is specifically "authorized to consider whether an attempt was made to resolve the issues in dispute before the resort to litigation." 106 In setting the amount of such awards, courts have looked at, among other things, the total award requested, the nature of the violation, and amounts other courts have awarded in similar cases.
107
As a result, in enforcing the MSAWPA, courts have attempted to maintain consistency across cases, to treat awards made in other cases as having, in effect, precedential value with respect to amount. Consistency is facilitated by the fact that many cases under the MSAWPA are not tried before a jury. 108 communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used.
C. Rules for the Protection and Dissemination of Information

110
Damages under the Act are scaled to the severity of the offense. A first offense of privately viewing a non-encrypted video or radio communication not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial advantage only triggers statutory damages of between $50 and $500.
111
For a repeat offender, still not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial advantage, damages rise to between $100 and $1,000.
112
If the offender has an illegal purpose or obtains a commercial advantage, however, damages become more severe; the court may award either (1) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation or (2) statutory damages equal to the greater of $100 per day of violation or $10,000 total. 113 The Tennessee Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act 114 similarly provides that any person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is intentionally intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of the Act may recover the greater of (1) actual damages or (2) statutory damages of $100 per day of violation or $10,000, whichever is greater.
115
The federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") extended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act's anti-wiretapping rules to computer and other digital and electronic communications.
116
If a violator had not been previously enjoined or found liable in a prior civil action under the ECPA, a plaintiff may recover "the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500." 117 If a defendant had previously been enjoined or found liable, a plaintiff may recovery "the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000." 118 The legislative history of the act suggests that this language was intended to authorize statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages. The federal Privacy Act of 1974 prescribes a code of fair information practices for federal agencies in the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal information. 120 An individual harmed by an agency's violation of the Act's requirements may bring a civil action for damages against the agency. If an agency intentionally or willfully fails to maintain accurate records or fails to protect personal information in a way that has adverse effects on an individual, it is liable for actual damages "but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000," 121 language nearly identical to that in the Stored Communications Act. As has been noted, however, in Doe v. Chao, 122 the Supreme Court construed this language to limit statutory damages to plaintiffs who could prove at least some actual damages, holding that the legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was irrelevant to construction of the Privacy Act.
123
Doe has led to widespread confusion in the lower courts.
124
With respect to records improperly maintained by state agencies, the California Information Practices Act 125 provides that a successful plaintiff shall recover, in addition to any special or general damages, a minimum of $2500 in what it terms "exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in the suit." 126 California law thus provides for more than double the amount of statutory damages as federal law does and is explicit about the noncompensatory purpose of those damages.
On the flip side, Ohio, like many jurisdictions, requires public offices to provide public records upon request.
127
In Ohio, however, if a request is made and not complied with, the statutory damages are set at $100 per day from the date of filing a mandamus action, up to a maximum of $1000. 128 The law recites that the "award of statutory damages shall not be construed as a penalty, but as compensation for injury arising from lost use of the requested information. The existence of this injury shall be conclusively presumed." 
D. Civil Rights Rules
Damages for violation of a plaintiff's civil rights present a further problem in the measurement of damages. Someone whose civil rights are violated may suffer economic or emotional harm. But even if she does not, she and all those with the same protected characteristics suffer dignitary injury. One excluded from a nightclub because of her race has been injured-and core American values have been offended-even if an A-list nightclub then admits her and she is not distressed by her initial exclusion at all.
Unlike federal civil rights law, California's Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act") 130 therefore authorizes damages as a remedy for discrimination by businesses "up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney's fees." 131 Thus, in California, a victim of discrimination is entitled to $4000 in statutory damages even if she suffers no actual economic or emotional harm.
A comparison of the Unruh Act with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 132 illustrates how statutory damages can enhance civil rights enforcement. The ADA declares that disabled individuals are entitled to the full benefit and access to the goods, services, and privileges of public accommodations. 133 Title III of the ADA requires places of public accommodation (including most private businesses that are open to the public) to remove physical barriers to access-steps, heavy doors, and narrow aisles-or to provide alternate means of access.
134
It does not, however, provide for statutory damages. Since it is not always the case that persons discriminated against in violation of the ADA suffer demonstrable actual damages, the ADA does not always protect their dignitary interests; nor does it give persons who have been discriminated against any economic incentive to assist in the enforcement of the act. By contrast, the Unruh Act, which is construed to incorporate the ADA's substantive requirements, authorizes an award of up to three times the amount of actual damages, but in no case less than $4000, against businesses who do not meet those requirements. plaintiff who has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability has greater recourse, and greater incentive to ensure that businesses comply with the law, than similarly situated plaintiffs in other states.
136
Another statute sometimes thought to fall within the civil rights category is the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE).
137
FACE authorizes criminal and civil remedies for violent, threatening, obstructive, and destructive conduct intended to injure, intimidate, or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services.
138
The damages provision states that a court may award any appropriate relief including compensatory and punitive damages. Recent changes to California procedure further limit the availability of statutory damages in construction-related accessibility claims. Attorneys who serve a demand or complaint on a violator must also serve a separate advisory notice. Id. § 55.54(a)(1). If the defendant qualifies for a stay and early evaluation conference, the court may stay the proceedings for ninety days unless the plaintiff has already obtained temporary injunctive relief. Id. § 55.54(d)(1). The court must also schedule a mandatory early evaluation conference for a date no later than seventy days after it issues the order. Id. § 55.54(d)(2). The defendant must file a copy of the Certified Access Specialist (CAS) inspection at least fifteen days before the conference. Id. § 55.54(d)(4)(A). In that same time-frame, the plaintiff must file and serve a list of the specific violations on the defendant's property, the amount of damages that the plaintiff is requesting, and the current amount of attorney's fees and costs. Id. 
E. Other Statutory Damage Provisions
The use of statutory damages is not limited to the four categories explored above.
We have already noted the Tennessee statute that authorizes up to $5,000 in statutory damages for the death of a pet from the person who caused that death or the injuries that led to that death.
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A
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Unlawfully destroying a tree may similarly not reduce the fair market value of the property in question, the standard common law measure of damages for wrongful destruction of ornamental trees. 144 Indeed, one could imagine circumstances in which doing so would increase the property's value. A tort recovery limited to economic loss might therefore afford the owner no or little recompense. New York solves this problem by authorizing statutory damages for the cutting, removing, injuring or destroying trees.
145
Even if defendant incorrectly believed she had the right to take such actions, she is still liable for the fair market value of the trees, $250 per tree, or both.
146
Plaintiff's damages may also include costs of litigation and reparation of the land. 147 Reparation, especially if the destroyed tree was mature, can be expensive. Finally, in Oregon, a person who receives a dishonored check may recover from the maker statutory damages in an amount equal to $100 or triple the amount for which the check is drawn, whichever is greater.
149
Such damages are to be awarded in addition to the amount for which the check was drawn, but may not be more than $500 over the amount for which the check was drawn. 150 Here, statutory damages are presumably used both to deter wrongful conduct and to compensate the victim for the difficult-to-prove inconveniences, neither economic nor in the nature of classic emotional distress, inherent in having to deal with a bounced check.
The statutory provisions described in this Part II constitute but a few illustrative examples of the use and structure of statutory damage provisions in state and federal law. They should, however, be sufficient to permit an informed exploration, to which we now turn, of the kinds of problems that lead legislatures to enact such provisions and the kinds of problems they can in turn create.
III. PURPOSES
The justifications legislatures, courts, and commentators have offered for statutory damages fall into three broad categories.
The first is remedial. Quintessentially, it is asserted that damages in the area in question, although real, are unusually hard to prove; statutory damages are set so as to approximate likely actual damages without requiring proof of such damages. It is also sometimes asserted that, for whatever reasons, ordinary common law damage rules are inadequate in particular contexts. In some situations, for example, a subjective loss rule may better accord with justice; since subjective losses are hard to establish with certainty, statutory damages may do a better job in the circumstances. It may also turn out that failure to provide for damages in excess of plaintiff's actual damages can unjustly enrich the wrongdoer; statutory damages can solve this problem as well.
A second set of justifications derives from criminal law theory. Statutory damages may deter behaviors that we seek to reduce. They may punish, regardless of whether they have any deterrent effect. In any event, they may serve an expressive function, declaring to the wrongdoer and the world society's disapproval of his actions.
Thirdly, statutory damages may alter the procedures and incentives to litigate that might otherwise pertain. Provision of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages may reduce or eliminate the cost of proving actual damages. Together with the increased litigation yields that statutory damages also authorize, this encourages litigation. In effect, statutory damages reflect a legislative intuition that more litigation of the type involved is better-that leaving the ordinary rules of civil litigation in place would result in too few lawsuits. Thus, statutory damage rules are commonly designed to make it possible for individual plaintiffs to bring cases they might otherwise not bring. They explicitly encourage private attorneys general to sue to vindicate the public interest. They may even substitute for criminal prosecution (without, of course, affording defendants the procedural protections to which they would otherwise be entitled in criminal court); many violations that trigger statutory damages are also crimes.
A. Remedial Purposes
The first and perhaps most important set of justifications for statutory damages is remedial-to better place each party in the position she would have been in in the absence of the violation. Statutory damages are, after all, part of the civil, not criminal, law; and the civil law's core purpose is remedial.
Compensation a. Difficulties of proof
It is often claimed that statutory damages are authorized to allow recovery where it might otherwise be difficult or impossible to prove the existence or amount of plaintiff's actual damages, notwithstanding the fact that we intuit that plaintiff has suffered some amount of such damages. Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, has testified before Congress that "Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act provides for the award of statutory damages at the plaintiff's election in order to provide greater security for copyright owners, who often find it difficult to prove actual damages in infringement cases-particularly in the electronic environment."
151
In particular, it is asserted that in copyright cases it is often difficult to prove the amount of profits plaintiff would have made had the infringement not occurred.
152
Copyright was originally about preventing business competitors from taking business away from the copyright owner by publishing a work to which plaintiff had exclusive rights. Senator Hatch's difficulty-of-proof rationale is plausible in such a context, although it may not warrant "an award that is 'more money than the entire music recording industry has made since Edison's invention of the phonograph in 1877,'" as the Copyright Act apparently authorized in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC. 153 Today, however, many of the most salient copyright cases are brought instead against individuals making copies for personal use. 154 Unless defendant retransmits to others (a separate copyright violation), actual damages in such cases are easy to calculate: defendant has been deprived of the price defendant should have paid-for a song or movie often less than $1 and rarely more than $20. The argument that plaintiff's damages from personal use downloading are more difficult to prove than if defendant had shoplifted the corresponding CD or DVD from a store is not credible. By failing to distinguish between business competitor cases and personal downloading cases, Congress has authorized a series of stunningly large awards in the latter category that sometimes seem to call the legitimacy of copyright law itself into question-at least within the demographic most likely to engage in the behavior sought to be deterred.
By contrast, the difficulty-of-proof rationale is more plausible in trademark cases under the Lanham Act.
155
In Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, high-end fashion designer Louis Vuitton asserted that the defendants' "willful, extensive, repeated and systematic counterfeiting of Louis Vuitton's valuable trademarks" warranted the maximum authorized statutory damage award.
156
The court awarded Louis Vuitton over three million dollars, observing that " [i] In business regulation cases, whether the difficulty-of-proof rationale is plausible varies from wrong to wrong. In railroad overcharge cases, for example, computation of plaintiff's actual loss is trivial-except in very unusual cases, it is simply the amount of the overcharge. By contrast, the inconvenience and distress consumers suffer when debt collectors violate the fair debt collection practice rules 158 or the economic losses borrowers suffer when lenders violate the Truth in Lending Act 159 by failing to disclose credit terms may be extremely difficult to prove or quantify.
Privacy, information disclosure, and civil rights cases often present similarly forbidding difficulty-of-proof problems. In many cases, the only conventional damages may arguably be for emotional distress-and even there it is generally unlikely that plaintiffs will suffer the kind of serious emotional harm for which compensation is normally awarded. Experience suggests, moreover, that in the absence of physical harm finders of fact are often reluctant to award emotional distress damages at all. A typical response to such claims in actions for discrimination is that of the Illinois Human Rights Commission: "awards for emotional distress are very much the exception, not the rule." 160 The same is true in privacy cases:
It is difficult . . . to calculate the damage suffered from the portrayal of someone in a false light or the intrusion into a person's seclusion. This is because the damages do not flow from a tangible loss. This is to be contrasted, for example, from the losses suffered in a car accident such as medical expenses and loss of income, which are tangible. 161 Statutory damage awards that reasonably approximate plaintiffs' likely actual, albeit unconventional, injuries solve these problems.
b. Adjustments to common law damage principles
Statutory damages are also sometimes used when common law damage principles fail to capture what the legislature believes to be plaintiff's true loss. The classic common law, for example, did not generally protect the kinds of dignitary interests implicated in civil rights 157 cases. The statutory damages authorized by California's Unruh Civil Rights Act solve this problem, at least in California.
Unjust Enrichment
Finally, statutory damages rules make available an alternative to the equitable remedy of disgorgement in cases involving unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer. Where a copyright violator earns more profits than the owner would have earned, for example, merely giving the owner damages in the amount of his lost profits will still leave the wrongdoer in a better position than if he had never committed the wrong. The flexibility to award statutory damages under the Copyright Act allows courts to prevent such results. The same is true in trademark cases. Whether it is true in other contexts will depend on the facts.
Although unjust enrichment is sometimes cited as a justification for statutory damages, such provisions are not required to remedy that particular wrong. Recoveries to remedy unjust enrichment are generally available even in the absence of statutory damage rules. What statutory damages do allow, however, is for a court to order recoupment of the wrongdoer's hypothetical profits without proof of the amount of such profits, presumably because of the difficulties of tendering such proof. Whether this is appropriate will depend on the circumstances.
B. Substitutes for Criminal Enforcement
To the extent statutory damages cannot be justified as approximating likely actual damages or preventing unjust enrichment, they are often justified as substitutes for criminal penalties. Recall the Supreme Court's defense in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 162 of the statutory damages awarded by Arkansas for railroad overcharges:
[T]he power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion. retribution requires proportionality-that the punishment fit the crime. If statutory damages under the Copyright Act cannot be justified as remedial and must instead be justified as quasi-criminal penalties, they become difficult to defend under retributive theory. It is hard to characterize a $1.92 million penalty as proportionate to the wrong of downloading twenty-four songs without paying for them. 164 Our current system of statutory damages for copyright violations is therefore more easily defended on a utilitarian basis, by reference to its ostensible deterrent effects. As Senator Orrin Hatch testified, today's sometime extreme statutory damages for copyright violations "provide greater deterrence for would-be infringers." similarly held that statutory damages for copyright infringement are not only "restitution of profit and reparation for injury," but also are in the nature of a penalty "designed to discourage wrongful conduct." 167 Extreme penalties for deterrence purposes are harder to justify, however, if they have no demonstrable deterrent effect or if one believes that all punishment must have at least some retributive justification.
C. Procedural Purposes
As remedial provisions, statutory damages attempt to place each party in the position she would have been in in the absence of the violation. As substitutes for criminal enforcement, they focus on the behavior of potential or actual wrongdoers, punishing, deterring, or both. A third general category of justifications focuses on statutory damages' procedural effects-their effects on the behavior of potential or actual litigants, and on the course of the litigation itself.
Encouraging litigation
Statutory damages almost always result in higher litigation returns at lower cost to plaintiffs. They typically reduce or eliminate the cost of proving actual damages and almost always increase plaintiff's recovery. Thus, statutory damages commonly reflect a legislative determination, explicit or implicit, that more litigation of the type involved would be 164 better-that leaving the ordinary rules of civil litigation in place would result in too few lawsuits. Statutory damage rules are therefore generally structured so as to enable individual plaintiffs to bring cases they might otherwise not bring. In the realm of consumer protection, for example, "[s]tatutory damages were meant to provide an individual plaintiff with the ability to bring a lawsuit when the anticipated damages are otherwise too low to provide an attorney with adequate incentive to take a case." 168 In this regard, statutory damages are not unique; other techniques used to encourage lawsuits that might otherwise not be worth bringing include treble damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and class actions. 169 As the sampling of statutory damage provisions in Part II illustrates, many legislative regimes that authorize statutory damages also authorize treble or punitive damages and the recovery of attorneys' fees, all to enable individual plaintiffs to bring cases they might otherwise not bring. Such remedies are commonly provided even in the absence of any actual harm.
For example, disclosure violations under the Truth in Lending Act usually do not involve actual damages.
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To make lawsuits economically worthwhile and encourage private enforcement of the Act, therefore, Congress authorizes the award of statutory damages in addition to any actual damages for violations of that Act. neither she nor the class she represented had suffered any economic harm. 176 Another way legislatures and courts sometimes articulate the same justification is to note that statutory damages are intended to encourage policing of the act in question by private attorneys general. Federal, state, and local enforcement agencies, civil or criminal, are often not equipped to identify and prosecute all potential violations of statutes within their jurisdiction. Statutory damages recruit private parties to fill this gap. Nearly every state, for example, has now extended to injured consumers the power to sue merchants who engage in deceptive practices. by contrast, is almost certain to be surprised. One suspects that the management of Chuck E. Cheese was stunned to learn that printing one extra digit on a receipt threatened corporate bankruptcy. 183 How many clients ever instruct their lawyers to compile lists of the statutory damage provisions to which they might be subject? Without hiring a lawyer to compile such a list, how would any ordinary human being ever become aware of the obscure and sometimes counter-intuitive rules we have explored here?
It is all very well to deem criminal defendants to have known the law. It is another matter entirely to pretend that the real world actually knows or cares about statutory damage rules until they are asserted in litigation.
IV. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Our review of a sample of statutory damage provisions in Part II and of their purposes in Part III suggest at least three common problems. First, unless special care is taken in drafting the statute, statutory damage awards are inherently ambiguous: it is almost always impossible to determine what part of a lump-sum award should be treated as an approximation of actual damages and what part as a substitute for the criminal law. In writing statutory damage provisions, legislatures often invoke formulary language-for example, "an award of statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just"-that fails to do anything to remedy this inherent ambiguity. An irrational decision-making process known as "anchoring" may even cause such formulary language to make things worse. Second, when combined with class certification, statutory damage awards often threaten results that cannot possibly have been within Congress's contemplation. Third, because they are not anchored to actual damages, even statutory damages awarded in individual cases can seem ridiculously large, given the underlying wrong they are supposed to remedy; it is unclear whether such awards are subject to constitutional limitations and, if so, which.
A. Ambiguity and the Rule of Law
Many of the problems courts encounter in interpreting and applying statutory damages provisions are consequences of the fact that statutory damages are inherently ambiguous, serving multiple, often poorly defined, functions. Legislatures commonly invoke statutory damages by enacting simple formulary language that fails to distinguish among those functions and specify how each such function might best be served. When awards are set by general jury verdict, judicial review of that verdict for compliance with applicable legal standards becomes near-impossible; it is often unclear what standards, if any, should apply and how, mechanically, courts can even begin to administer them. In consequence, statutory damage rules can produce wildly inconsistent awards in factually similar cases, inconsistent interpretations of similar statutory provisions, and penalties completely out of proportion to the wrongs they are supposed to punish or deter. This hardly seems consistent with the rule of law.
The Copyright Act's statutory damage provisions, among the most open-ended of any, illustrate these difficulties vividly. Section 504(c)(1) and (2) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. . . . In a case where . . . infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.
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The italicized language is the sum total of Congress's guidance to judges and juries: "as the court considers just." We should not be surprised to see verdicts for indistinguishable wrongs that differ by an order of magnitude and a requested award for "more money than the entire music recording industry has made since Edison's invention of the phonograph in 1877."
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Part of the problem is the lack of a theory of statutory damages. We will not presume to offer any such theory. Based on our examination of a reasonably large sampling of statutory damages provisions in Part II and of their purposes in Part III, however, we can offer two general, and possibly useful, observations and a number of specific implementing suggestions. Our goal in this Part IV.A is simply to help courts and legislatures disentangle the multiple functions of statutory damages, interpret or write statutory damage rules in a manner consistent with their intended functions, and implement such rules in a manner consistent with the rule of law.
Interpreting Statutory Damage Rules to Effectuate Their Purposes
Premise 1: When legislatures enact statutory damage provisions, they have almost certainly concluded that the ordinary common law of damages is inadequate to their purposes. To constrain statutory damage rules to common law principles without clear evidence that the legislature intended to do so, therefore, risks frustrating the legislature's likely purposes. The Doe v. Chao interpretation of the Privacy Act, for example, which limited statutory damages to plaintiffs able to prove actual damages, 184. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2) (2012) (emphasis added). 185. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. applied a basic common law principle in a way that frustrated private enforcement of the Act in all but the most unusual circumstances. Given the limited resources of government attorneys and the many competing demands on those resources, this means that the Privacy Act is unlikely to be enforced at all-except, again, in the most egregious circumstances. This was almost certainly not Congress's intention.
If courts accept this first premise, their first step in construing any statutory damage provision should be to ask why the legislature concluded that the common law of damages was likely to be inadequate in the circumstances. Construing the statute in a manner consistent with plausible answers to this question is much more likely to effectuate the legislature's purposes than either a common law interpretation (by hypothesis rejected by the legislature as inadequate) or a blind "plain language" approach.
In so inquiring, courts may usefully ask why the legislature authorized statutory damages in the context in question but did not do so in roughly analogous circumstances. Why, for example, did Tennessee authorize statutory damages for the killing of a dog, but not for the killing of a child? Why did Congress authorize statutory damages in copyright, but not in patent?
The answer to the first question is both straightforward and useful: emotional distress damages for the killing of a child were already available at common law, while the common law treated the killing of a dog as a mere destruction of property.
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The Tennessee legislature seems to have intended to permit recovery for a type of harm not classically compensable at common law. The statute should be so construed.
The answer to the second is less clear but potentially equally useful. In the paradigm patent infringement case, as in the standard common law case, validity and infringement (and hence liability) are typically contested and fault is a priori unclear. Congress may therefore have viewed it appropriate that patent law adhere, for the most part, 187 to the tried-andtrue principles of the common law of damages. In the paradigm case of copyright infringement, by contrast, validity and infringement are often obvious; damages, much less so. Congress may therefore have thought it fair in the standard case to treat copyright infringers as having accepted the risks of getting caught, deprive them of any windfall by reason of difficulties in proof of damages by the copyright owner, and include a significant punitive or deterrent component in the damages available. If so, again, the statute should be so construed.
Structuring Statutory Damage Litigation to Permit Effective Judicial Review
Premise 2: In enacting statutory damage rules, legislatures have typically concluded that the ordinary common law of damages is inadequate to their purposes for one or more of two reasons. First, some portion of an award may be intended to approximate plaintiff's likely actual damages, possibly including damages not compensable at classic common law, without requiring proof of such damages. Second, even if plaintiffs have suffered no actual damages, some portion may be intended to encourage them to sue to vindicate the public policy protected by the statute. Any award in excess of the amounts needed to accomplish these first two objectives is likely to be deterrent or punitive, and therefore subject to the concerns courts face in setting or reviewing deterrent or punitive awards.
The problem for judges and juries is that the damages that perform these different functions are typically wrapped together in a single lump sum. Juries do not typically award one amount as an approximation of likely actual damages, a second to induce plaintiff to litigate, and a third as punishment for the wrong. Were they to do so, such awards would likely be much better anchored in reality. Because juries are invited instead to award a single lump sum, however, they probably give little separate thought to each of these separate functions. The single lump sum is more likely to be awarded from the gut-that is, "as the court considers just." And this, in turn, is likely to make judicial review of the resulting award for compliance with the law deeply problematic.
If it is thought to be desirable to better anchor statutory damage awards in the facts of the particular case and the purposes of the particular statute, a first step might be to ask juries to award separate amounts to effectuate each of that statute's purposes-one to approximate likely actual damages (not proven actual damages, since plaintiffs are not required to prove their actual damages), a second as a token to induce plaintiffs to sue to vindicate the policies underlying the statute (but only if the first is inadequate to the purpose), and a third as punishment. Thus, for example, a jury considering an award of statutory damages for the unlawful downloading of twentyfour songs might conclude that (1) $240 generously approximates plaintiff's likely actual damages, (2) $5000 plus attorneys' fees is sufficient to give plaintiff an incentive to litigate, and (3) a further award in some amount (probably not $1.92 million) is just punishment in the circumstances. A mechanism for asking juries to just do this already exists-the special verdict.
Another possibility would be to permit introduction of evidence of actual damages or likely actual damages not by plaintiff, since plaintiffs are not required to prove actual damages, but by defendant. If a defendant accused of having unlawfully downloaded twenty-four songs can put before the jury the fact that she could have purchased those same songs lawfully for ninety-nine cents each, it seems much less likely that the jury will award a judgment of $1.92 million against her for her wrongful action.
In response, some may assert that one of the purposes of statutory damage provisions is to make actual damages irrelevant. This, however, is not true. One of the purposes is to relieve plaintiff of his evidentiary burden in circumstances in which actual damages are hard to prove.
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But clearly, the amount of actual harm inflicted is relevant to whether an award of any particular size would be "just"-the statutory benchmark under the Copyright Act. To preclude defendant from effectively litigating whether plaintiff's requested award is "just" would be to preclude her from defending herself altogether in a case with strong punitive overtones. It would be like prohibiting a criminal defendant from introducing mitigating evidence at a sentencing hearing.
In judge-tried cases, problems can also be minimized if finders of fact look to awards in similar cases as precedent, as courts now commonly do when making statutory damage awards under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. 189 Technically, of course, such awards are not "law," and have no precedential value. Seeking consistency among awards, however, minimizes the likelihood of disparate awards on similar facts and will eventually produce a set of de facto common law rules as to what may be "just" in the circumstances. the offense: (1) between $50 and $500 for a first offense of privately viewing a non-encrypted video or radio communication not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial advantage, (2) between $100 and $1000 for a repeat offender, still not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial advantage, (3) but if the offender has an illegal purpose or obtains a commercial advantage, damages equal to the greater of actual damages or the greater of $100 per day of violation or $10,000 total.
Drafting Unambiguous Statutory
191
Had Congress similarly distinguished between commercial use and personal use downloading under the Copyright Act, much mischief could have been avoided.
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Even providing non-binding guidance within the statute itself can improve decision-making. Consider, for example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which provides for statutory damages in the discretion of the court, but asks the court to consider at least three factors:
(1) the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, (2) the nature of the noncompliance, and (3) the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional.
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Placing such guidance within the statute itself avoids arguments about whether consideration of legislative history is permitted in statutory interpretation.
B. Anchoring and Over-Compensation
Anchoring, a psychological quirk in the way we process information, may exacerbate problems with the rationality of awards under some statutes-the Copyright Act comes particularly to mind. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman uses the following example to explain how anchoring works. If you are asked how old Gandhi was when he died and do not know the answer, you will tend to give the average age people die. If you are instead asked whether Ghandi was 114 years old when he died, you will likely give a much higher answer; if you are asked whether he was 35 years old when he died, a much lower. Logically, how the question is asked should not matter. But repeated experiments prove that it does. We tend to use any number included in the question as an anchor in determining our answer.
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Consider two possible ways of writing the Copyright Act's statutory damage provision.
First: "The copyright owner may recover an award of statutory damages in a sum of not less than $750, as the court considers just."
Second: "The copyright owner may recover an award of statutory damages in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $150,000, as the court considers just."
The anchoring literature predicts that juries will use the concrete dollar amounts given in the second version as anchors. In a case that seems factually midway between the worst possible and best possible (but still unlawful) behaviour, they may split the difference, awarding, say, $75,000 per work infringed-almost exactly what the jury awarded in Capitol Records Inc. v. 195 to punish a defendant who had illegally downloaded and shared twenty-four songs over the Internet. Had the Capitol Records jury instead been instructed to award statutory damages "in a sum of not less than $750, as you consider just" for the wrong of downloading twenty-four songs, anchoring theory suggests that the award would likely have been much lower.
It is possible, therefore, that setting a high upper bound to statutory damage awards, rather than no upper bound, may result in higher average awards-for irrational reasons. The Capitol Records jury may not have set its award at $1.92 million for any of the reasons Congress had in mind when it wrote the statute; it may rather have been influencedirrationally-by a number Congress placed in the statute as an upper limit on damage awards, a number not intended to function as an anchor at all. Legislatures may wish to consider this problem when considering whether to set high upper bounds to such awards. outlandish results. In the introduction, we noted the Chuck E. Cheese litigation, in which defendant admitted to having printed more than five digits of its customers' credit card numbers. 197 Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, defendant would have been liable for statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 for each individual failure-an amount Congress apparently thought sufficient to induce individual plaintiffs to sue to enforce the Act.
C. Class Actions and the Multiplier Effect
198
Because the case was brought as a class action, however, defendant's total exposure for its harmless one-digit mistake was almost $2 billion.
We have called this the Chuck E. Cheese problem; it might also be called the "multiplier effect." Class actions take amounts thought to be reasonable to induce individual plaintiffs to bring individual actions, notwithstanding the lack of actual damages, and turn them into caricatures of a lawyer's fevered imagination. As the court wrote more soberly in an order approving a settlement in Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.: "Each of these tools is intended to encourage the prosecution of cases that would otherwise be too costly for an individual plaintiff to pursue. The combination of the two threatens defendants with the multiplication of statutory damages, possibly beyond the contemplation of Congress and the limits of due process." In a 1995 case similarly not involving statutory damages, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, agreed with the Ninth Circuit's reading of the class action rule. 205 The court ordered decertification of the plaintiff class in question in part because of a concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination of their liability for the colossal misfortune that has befallen [plaintiff class] to emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions. 206 Were class certification permitted to stand, Judge Posner wrote, defendants might "easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle." 207 He went on to quote Judge Friendly, who had called settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action "blackmail settlements." 208 The Second Circuit expressed similar concerns in Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.
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Plaintiff there sought to certify a class of cable television subscribers, each of whom qualified to receive minimum statutory damages of $1000 for Time Warner's alleged violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act. 210 The court acknowledged "the potential for a devastatingly large damages award, out of all reasonable proportion to the actual harm suffered by members of the plaintiff class." 211 up to 12 million cable subscribers," the court observed, "[the] lawsuit could potentially impose on Defendant Time Warner liability for $12 billion. Even for one of the world's largest corporations, that is a lot of money." 212 Nevertheless, the court reversed as premature the district court's refusal to certify the requested class. 213 Six years later, as part of a comprehensive settlement of the case, class certification was granted. 214 District courts in other cases, however, continued to follow Ratner. 215 Then, in Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 216 the Ninth Circuit reversed course. The problem with certifying a class in Kline, the court observed, was not the size of the potential award relative to the size of the defendant. The problem was rather that certification of the defendant class in that case would have rendered each member of the class jointly and severally liable for penalties imposed for other members' wrongdoing-an absurd result not present in the standard FACTA case. 217 But "[t]o deny class certification based on the potential amount of damages as compared to the extent of harm," the court reasoned, "presumes that Congress left it to the courts to evaluate the relative amount of liability necessary to serve the statute's compensatory and deterrent purposes."
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Noting that Congress had capped statutory damages in class actions in a number of other contexts, the court noted that Congress had not done so with regard to FACTA. "In the absence of such affirmative steps to limit liability, we must assume that Congress intended FACTA's remedial scheme to operate as it was written. To limit class availability merely on the basis of 'enormous' potential liability that Congress explicitly provided for would subvert congressional intent." 219 The court left open the possibility of a different result, however, if "the potential liability would result in bankruptcy."
In the wake of Bateman, district courts in the Ninth Circuit began certifying plaintiff classes in FACTA cases. In In re Toys "R" UsDelaware, 221 for example, the trial court reversed its prior denial of class certification in a case involving potential statutory damages of between $2.9 billion and $29 billion (the company's net worth was $117 million.) 222 Unsurprisingly, within a month after the class was certified, the case settled. 223 What is now the law? In the Ninth Circuit, Bateman rules. Nationwide FACTA class actions are therefore brought in the Ninth Circuit. No other circuit appears to have had an opportunity to speak to the question. Given the Seventh and Second Circuits' expressed reservations in prior cases, it is not clear they would follow Bateman. Given that plaintiffs' attorneys can effectively choose their circuit, however, we may never know.
A simple legislative solution is readily available. As has been noted, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1978, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act of 1983 all include explicit caps on class action statutory damage awards. 224 All statutory damage rules with respect to which plaintiff class actions are a real possibility should so provide.
In the meantime, corporate defendants face an impossible dilemma. As the Bateman court noted, defendants may ultimately seek reduction of any award that is unconstitutionally excessive. 225 (The Bateman court itself reserved judgment on this question).
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To do so, however, they must forego settlement and endure the entry of judgment-a judgment which if upheld may spell corporate ruin. There is no way to test the constitutional question without placing the entire company at risk.
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So defendants are under great pressure to settle even statutory damage class action suits of questionable merit.
D. Excessive Statutory Damages
Many legal scholars have compared the problem of excessive statutory damages to punitive damage awards, which are now subject to due process limitations.
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In the Time Warner case, the Second Circuit recognized the potential due process concerns raised when statutory damages are aggregated in class actions, citing State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, part of the Supreme Court's excessive punitive damages jurisprudence. 229 It noted, however, that such due process concerns could not be raised without "actual evidence presented that raises a reasonable possibility that principles of due process may restrict an ultimate damages award."
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As a practical matter, of course, in the face of multiplier effects, most defendants cannot afford to risk judgment; they settle instead.
Were a court ever to reach the excessive damages issue, it would need to resolve a threshold question: Are legislatively authorized statutory damage awards subject to the Supreme Court's punitive damage jurisprudence? Or are they rather limited, if at all, by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "excessive fines"?
With respect to the first, the Supreme Court held that excessive punitive damage awards may violate the due process clause in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.
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Gore claimed that BMW had committed fraud by hiding prior repair work to the car it sold him. 232 There was evidence that BMW had done so and had engaged in similar practices nationwide.
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The jury awarded Gore actual damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $4 million, an amount later cut to $2 million. The majority embraced an individualized, desert-oriented vision of proportionality review, focusing on a comparison of the gravity of the individual's particular offense with the severity of the particular punitive forfeiture imposed. In contrast, the dissent embraced a utilitarian proportionality review, emphasizing legislative determinations about the seriousness of classes of offenses and taking into account factors not related to the individual's offense, such as the need for severe punishment to serve crime control interests.
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Were Bajakajian and the excessive fines clause to be applied to Mrs. Thomas-Rasset and her twenty-four downloaded songs, for example, the focus would be on the gravity of her particular offense, not on the gravity of illegal downloading generally. It is beyond the scope of this article to resolve which line of cases, Gore or Bajakajian, applies to statutory damages or what either demands in the statutory damage context, if it applies. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that until the various components of lump-sum statutory damage awards can be disaggregated, applying either will be difficult. If neither Gore nor Bajakajian applies, however, avoiding constitutional limitations on excessive penalties is trivial: a legislature need only structure such penalties as statutory damages. One assumes that this cannot be so.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have not heretofore treated statutory damage provisions as a class of legal rules with common purposes, problems, and possible solutions. As this article demonstrates, doing so may advance our understanding of such provisions, assist courts in interpreting and administering specific such provisions, and help legislatures draft new statutory damage rules in ways that minimize problems and more effectively accomplish the legislatures' intended purposes.
